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Abstract
Governments are committed to reducing the regulatory burden on 
business and individuals, while at the same time transferring many tasks 
from bureaucrats.  One such example is tax compliance where self 
assessment has raised concerns that such transfers may place a 
particularly heavy burden on lower income and elderly taxpayers.  This 
is the first study since its introduction into the UK in 1996 of the
regulatory burden which self assessment imposes on individuals.  We 
identify both the total compliance burden and its components for 
individuals who might be expected to incur high compliance costs 
because they pay tax on non business employment income.  We use a 
specially designed questionnaire and find that within this group the 
burden seems to have increased by less than 25 per cent.  Compliance 
costs are regressive, but do not impinge disproportionately on the 
elderly.  The compliance burden is determined by income, occupation,
education (but not specifically in accounting subjects) and difficulty in 
attending to tax affairs, indicating some possibilities for reducing these 
compliance costs.
Corresponding author: –Catherine Waddams, ESRC Centre for Competition Policy,
University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, United Kingdom - email: 
c.waddams@uea.ac.uk
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1996 the UK introduced self assessment (SA) for personal taxpayers 
(Chennells et al., 2000) joining the US, Canada, Spain and Australia.  The transfer of 
substantial administrative costs from officials to individuals coincides with a declared 
Government objective to minimise the regulatory burden on individuals (CIOT, 
2002).  This is the first study of the effect of the new system in the UK, focusing on 
taxpayers who would be expected to have high compliance costs.  We identify the 
components and the burden of compliance for these taxpayers, and test concerns that 
the new system is regressive and that pensioners may carry a disproportionate burden.  
To inform the government policy of reducing regulatory burden, we identify the 
determinants of compliance costs and discuss the implications of our findings.
Though the notion of tax compliance cost was discussed by Adam Smith in the 
‘Wealth of Nations’ (Smith, 1776), the first attempt to measure such costs occurred
some 150 years later (Haig, 1935, cited in Tran-Nam et al., 2000).  More recently the 
UK Government has insisted that all new regulations should be subject to a 
Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA), to estimate the costs imposed on society (Rice, 
2001). Taxation RIAs had focused primarily on business costs before 1998  and this 
study is one of comparatively few which measures costs incurred by individual 
taxpayers.  
Sandford (1995) defines ‘tax compliance costs’ as «the costs incurred by 
taxpayers in meeting the requirements laid on them by the tax law and the revenue 
authorities», in addition to the tax liability itself.  Compliance costs are usually 
classified into three categories: monetary costs, such as payment for tax advice, 
personal or incidental expenses (telephone calls, travelling costs) and the financial
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costs of acquiring tax knowledge, for example through the purchase of books; time 
costs, in acquiring tax knowledge, keeping tax records and completing tax returns; 
and psychological costs such as anxiety and vexation (Sandford, 1973).
Several studies have assessed compliance costs for employers in the UK, with 
particular emphasis on the burden for small businesses (e.g. Rice, 2001; Hudson and 
Godwin, 2000)1, which bear heavier compliance costs than the self-employed and
large firms (Besim and Jenkins, 2005).  The only previous publication on personal 
taxpayer compliance costs in the UK is by Sandford et al., and predates self 
assessment (Sandford et al., 1989). Sandford’s sample covered all categories of 
income taxpayers, and found that most taxpayers spent little or no time on tax affairs, 
because they were relatively simple and conducted through the Pay As You Earn 
(PAYE) scheme, administered by employers.  This study analyses the effect of the 
self assessment scheme on those who are taxed outside the PAYE scheme but for 
whom self employment is not the main source of income.  
For taxpayers as a whole, Sandford found that an average of 3.6 hours were spent 
on tax matters in 1983-84 and that total compliance costs were 3.6 per cent of 
revenue from income tax and Corporate Gains Tax.  Some 10 per cent of taxpayers 
paid for tax advice, and the main determinants of compliance cost level were size of 
income and category of employment. Compliance costs also showed a regressive 
pattern for self employed taxpayers, i.e. they were proportionately higher for lower 
income groups.
1
 See Evans (2003) for a summary of most studies on taxation operating costs published between 1980 
and 2003.
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In Australia, as in the UK, self assessment was only recently introduced2.  Tran-
Nam et al.’s study (2000) conducted two years after self assessment was introduced
in Australia, shows that taxpayers allocated 8.5 hours of their time and 7.9 per cent of 
their revenue to tax affairs.  Somewhat surprisingly, both the hours spent and 
financial costs were lower than those shown in a study ten years earlier, before the 
introduction of self assessment (Pope and Fayle, 1990).
Other studies of compliance costs of individual income taxation have been 
undertaken in countries where self assessment is more established, such as the US
(Blumenthal and Slemrod, 1992; Slemrod and Sorum, 1984), Canada (Vaillancourt, 
1986) and Spain (Delgado et al., 2001; and Díaz and Delgado, 1995).  For the tax 
year 1989-1990, Blumenthal and Slemrod found that a taxpayer allocated on average 
27.4 hours of his time and 5.6 per cent of income tax revenue to tax matters.  Total 
compliance costs were higher for high-income and self employed taxpayers.  A 
comparable study conducted by Slemrod and Sorum in 1982 also found that 
taxpayers allocated a high number of hours to tax affairs (21.7); their average
compliance costs represented 5-7% of personal income tax revenue and the figures 
were higher for self employed taxpayers (Slemrod and Sorum, 1984).  
Vaillancourt (1989) found that in 1985 Canadian taxpayers who did not pay for 
assistance devoted on average 5.5 hours to tax matters, while taxpayers paying for tax 
advice spent 2.5 per cent of their revenue from tax income.  He also found that the 
higher the complexity of a taxpayer’s tax situation, the greater the time and money 
spent dealing with tax affairs.  
2
 SA was introduced in Australia in 1992.
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Studies investigating tax compliance costs on personal income tax for Spanish 
taxpayers (Delgado et al., 2001; and Díaz and Delgado, 1995) reviewed the tax years 
1998 and 1999 for the former and 1991 for the later study. Delgado et al. compare 
tax compliance costs before and after the introduction of the 1999 Spanish Personal 
Income Tax reform, which aimed at decreasing the hidden tax burden on taxpayers.  
The study shows that the time spent by taxpayers on their tax matters was higher in 
1998 than in 1999 (3.6 and 2.2 hours respectively) and the compliance costs as a 
percentage of revenue yield was 1.8 per cent in 1998 and 1.3 per cent in 1999.
Before reform Díaz and Delgado show that taxpayers were spending an average of 
6.8 hours and 3.3 per cent of tax revenue on tax affairs.
Analyses of tax compliance costs in countries such as Croatia, Slovenia, Sweden, 
the Netherlands and Germany where the tax system does not operate under self 
assessment, have also been conducted; results are summarised in Table 1 in Appendix
1.  In these countries, the average amount of time spent by taxpayers on tax matters is 
relatively low, with 1.4 hours for Swedish taxpayers, 1.7 hours for Croatian and 
Slovenian taxpayers, 4.5 hours for the Dutch and 11 hours for German taxpayers.
Compliance costs as a percentage of revenue from personal income tax in those 
countries vary from 0.8 per cent for Croatia to 3 per cent for the Netherlands; figures 
for Sweden and Slovenia are 1.7 per cent and 1.9 per cent, respectively.  
The literature seems to conclude that total tax compliance costs are high in 
countries where self assessment is well established, low where self assessment is not 
part of the tax system and at an intermediate level for countries where self assessment
has recently been introduced.  
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A summary of major studies on taxation operating costs published between 1980 
and 2003 is given in Evans (2003).  Table 1 updates Evans’s list of studies on 
compliance costs, focussing specifically on personal income tax.  Only three studies 
in this area, including Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992), Vaillancourt (1989) and 
Slemrod and Sorum (1984) have investigated the relationship between compliance 
costs and demographic determinants. 
Our study extends these and earlier UK studies by assessing the influence on 
compliance costs of demographic factors.  We focus on both time and money costs, 
and how they depend on income, sources of income, general and accounting 
education and the usual demographic variables both for taxpayers who do and do not 
pay for assistance with their tax affairs.  The data used to measure the main personal 
compliance costs of direct taxation in the UK are from a survey of 320 ‘Employment 
income’ (formerly named ‘Schedule E income’)3 individual taxpayers and relate to 
the tax year 1998-1999 shortly after self assessment was introduced.  They are 
therefore likely to have complex tax affairs which are not dealt with primarily 
through their employment.  While we have made no attempt to measure psychic costs 
directly, the data do include measures of attitude towards tax affairs and perception of 
difficulty with tax affairs.
In the next section we describe our data and in section 3 the model; section 4 
gives results and section 5 provides a summary and concluding discussion.  
3
 On 6 April 2003, Schedule E was removed from the statute book under the ‘The Income Tax 
(Earnings and Pensions) Act (ITEPA) 2003’; ‘Schedule E income’ is now being referred to as 
‘Employment income’.  
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II. DATA
Our data were generated from a questionnaire especially designed for this study 
and administered to 320 taxpayers in 2000.  These were drawn from a sampling frame 
of 1000 individuals randomly selected by the Inland Revenue from UK taxpayers
who were reporting their tax affairs within the Self Assessment system, and whose 
income was not primarily from self employment. Each of the 1000 was given the 
opportunity to ‘opt out’ of the study; 200 did so and a questionnaire (available on 
request from the authors) was mailed to the remaining 800.  320 were returned and 
analysed4. The group has higher income than the average for UK taxpayers.  We 
compared the characteristics of our sample with those of the 4,414,512 individuals5
which form the population from which our sample was selected.
Table 2 shows a comparison of such characteristics6.  We see that our sample is 
considerably younger than the population of taxpayers from which it is drawn, with 
significant non response from the over 65s and those on pensions.  The sample also 
under represents the proportion paying for tax advice.  The pattern of income sources 
(apart from pensions) is broadly comparable, but those receiving dividends are over-
represented in our sample. While the sample skewness results in some groups being 
too small for meaningful analysis, it should not prevent identification of factors 
which affect compliance costs. In calculating average figures for compliance costs 
and their component parts we have weighted the sample so that the figures reflect the 
characteristics of the population rather than those of the sample.  
4
 This main postal survey was preceded by a pilot study.
5 Provided by the Inland Revenue for SA database in 1999 and whose main source of income is 
employment.
6
 Since the purpose of our study was to focus on taxpayers for whom compliance costs were likely to 
be high, the sample of respondents was deliberately chosen to be unrepresentative of the taxpaying 
population as a whole.
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The questionnaire collected demographic information, as well as information on 
whether tax advisers were used, capital gains tax, and time spent in completing the 
questionnaire. We focus on demographic characteristics and the use of tax advisers; 
and on the effect of both general education and, more specifically, whether 
accounting courses had been completed. 
The demographic data collected included gender, marital status, age, education, 
occupation and income. Respondents were asked the number of hours allocated to 
tax matters and the preparation of tax returns over the course of the tax year 1998-99,
and whether and how much they had paid for assistance with their tax affairs.
Taxpayers were also asked about other expenditure incurred in association with their
tax affairs, such as travel or telephone bills. Other information included the difficulty 
experienced with tax affairs, whether they enjoyed dealing with tax matters, and the 
time taken to complete the questionnaire.
Three components of compliance cost were estimated: the hours spent on tax 
matters; the value of those hours7; and monetary outlay, including payment to tax 
advisers when incurred.  We identify as total financial compliance costs the sum of 
value of time spent and monetary outlay.  The variables are defined and their 
distributions described in Table 3.  The next section explores these relationships 
further.
7 Value of time was calculated as annual income divided by 1772 and multiplied by the number of 
hours spent on tax matters (see Sandford et al., 1989).
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III. MODEL
We assume that taxpayers wish to minimise the total burden associated with their 
tax liability, i.e. the sum of their tax paid (L) and their compliance costs (TCC):
L(Y) + TCC
where L depends mainly on income Y.  Those with higher income have a greater 
incentive to incur compliance costs to reduce their higher potential tax liability, other 
things being equal. We expect a negative relationship between the time spent on tax 
affairs (Ch) and whether an accountancy course has been undertaken (CA) and the 
number of years in education (E).  The variable ‘age’ is anticipated to be positively 
related to the time spent on tax affairs if we take into account retired individuals who 
have more time in general.  We had no prior expectation about the role of gender in 
our dependent variables and other relevant studies had not found any significant 
relationship.  We expected that married respondents would spend fewer hours dealing 
with their tax affairs since they could discuss matters with their spouse.  To 
encourage an adequate response to the questionnaire we did not ask for information 
on tax liability, since this was thought to be too sensitive; but we are able to include 
(banded) information on income.  Income would affect the time which a taxpayer is 
willing to devote to tax affairs, but in an ambiguous way.  Higher income respondents 
would generally have higher tax bills and so might be willing to spend more time on 
their tax affairs in order to reduce this bill; however, these individuals have a higher 
opportunity cost of time which may lead to them spending less time on their tax 
affairs.  We expect compliance cost to depend on the complexity of the tax return and 
the individual’s inherent ability to deal with such affairs.  The complexity of the tax 
return would increase with the number of income sources (FY) and may depend on 
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the main occupation of the taxpayer (O).  Employed individuals may spend less time 
on tax matters in comparison to other occupations, since employers deal with a large 
part of the taxes through the Pay As You Earn scheme.  Other sources of income were 
divided into three categories in order to identify which generated most hours on tax 
affairs.  How long the questionnaire took to complete provides an independent 
measure of the respondent’s ability to deal with such forms, which are similar to 
those encountered in tax affairs.  We would expect a positive relationship.
Taxpayers incur psychic as well as financial costs in completing their tax affairs.  
In common with most other studies, we did not attempt to measure psychic costs of 
compliance directly, but we explored the relation between the costs of compliance, 
whether the respondent enjoyed or disliked dealing with tax affairs, and how difficult 
they found them.  The effect of disliking tax affairs on compliance cost is unclear, 
and depends on causality: individuals who dislike it do not want to spend a lot of time 
on tax affairs; but respondents who need to spend much time and/or money dealing 
with their tax matters will come to dislike it.  We consider the relationship with the 
time taken to complete the questionnaire (as an arbitrary bureaucratic exercise) to test 
whether difficulty with tax affairs is an intrinsic personal characteristic.  If it is, then 
the coefficient will be positive once other determinants of compliance costs are taken 
into account.  Just as these factors help explain the financial costs, they also provide 
some indication of psychic costs.  In the remainder of the analysis we focus on the 
financial costs (C) and their constituent parts, and return later to a qualitative 
discussion of psychic costs. The direction of expected relationships between 
variables is summarised in Table 4.  
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Apart from the initial balance between tax liability and compliance costs, each 
taxpayer faces some further trade off between the three different constituents of 
financial compliance cost which we have measured, namely investing their own time, 
paying a tax adviser, and incurring incidental expenses.  However, while this is true 
for each individual within our cross-section sample, we expect that those with highly 
complex tax affairs are likely to require both expert advice and to devote a substantial 
amount of their own time to collect the necessary information.  Indeed the raw 
correlations in Table 5 confirm this across our sample.  We are therefore unable to 
model the trade off for any one taxpayer.  However we are able to explore the 
relationship a little further by including a dummy for those who pay for assistance 
with tax affairs in modelling time spent on tax affairs.  Our main objective is to 
explain the total figure, providing analysis of each component separately to help 
explain how the total is composed.  For this reason we do not report the results of a 
simultaneous choice model in which payment for tax advice is modelled contingent 
on choosing to consult advisors8.  Our basic model is therefore:
Time and Financial Compliance Costs = C(income; education; age; gender;
marital status; main occupation of taxpayers; number of income sources;
attitude to tax affairs; difficulty with tax affairs; time to complete 
questionnaire)
We use a similar model for each of the constituent parts and consider each of 
these in turn.  These results are reported in Appendix 2.
8
 Such a two stage modelling process might be appropriate if the focus of explanation was the 
determinants of the presence and the quantity of such payments to advisers. 
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To identify any functional form misspecification or heteroscedasticity in the error 
variance, we used Ramsey’s reset test (Ramsey, 1969) and White’s heteroscedasticity 
test (White, 1980).  Results indicated that the models were not misspecified and there 
was not heteroscedasticity in the data.  The MWD test was conducted to choose 
between linear and log-linear regression models (MacKinnon, White and Davidson, 
1983).  The results of the test showed that a double-log functional form was 
appropriate for the models.  All four dependent variables (hours spent, value of time, 
fees to advisers and total compliance costs) as well as continuous dependent variables 
(income, education, age and number of income sources) were rescaled by a 
logarithmic transformation.  The main regression equation discussed above is
described in Box 1.
BOX 1    REGRESSION EQUATIONS
The regression equation for each type of compliance cost, t, takes the following form:
ln Cit =  + µ1 ln Yi + µ2 ln Ei + µ3 CAi + µ4 ln Ai + µ5 Fi + µ6 Mi + µ7 Oi + µ8 ln FYi + µ9 ATi
+ µ10 DTi + µ11 lnTi + i
Where:  
ln Cit = natural logarithm of ‘total financial compliance costs’ (calculated, see 
Table 3) 
ln Yi = natural logarithm of ‘income’
ln Ei = natural logarithm of ‘education’ 
CAi = course in accountancy undertaken (bivariate variable)
ln Ai = natural logarithm of ‘age’ 
Fi = female (bivariate variable)
Mi = married (bivariate variable)
Oi = occupation (dummy variable)
ln FYi = natural logarithm of ‘number of income sources’
ATi = attitude towards tax affairs (categorical variable)
DTi = difficulty with tax affairs (categorical variable)
ln Ti = natural logarithm of ‘time taken to complete the questionnaire’
i = error term
Note: the subscript ‘i’ refers to an individual taxpayer.
Similar equations were run for each of the constituent parts of compliance costs 
(see Appendix 2).
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To test whether financial tax compliance costs as a whole were regressive with 
respect to income (regardless of other determinants) we analysed the relationship 
between the average compliance costs per £ of income and the level of income.  If 
compliance costs are regressive, we would expect the relationship to be negative.
IV. RESULTS
Our sample spent an average of 8 hours a year on their tax affairs, with a mean 
value (based on individuals’ income) of £326.  27% employed tax advisers, paying on 
average of £698 for this service.  An average of £15 was spent on incidental costs, 
and the average total cost of compliance was £498.  Correcting for the known
unrepresentativeness of the sample, the average time spent on tax affairs for this 
population is estimated at 4.5 hours, with average compliance cost (including value of 
time) £285.  Table 6 shows how the weighted averages compare with the sample 
statistics; Table 7 shows the average compliance costs for different income groups.
Within our sample (as in the population), a majority of respondents (73 and 62 
per cent, respectively) did not pay for tax advice; the main reasons chosen from 12 
specified options by these taxpayers were ‘I feel quite capable of handling my own 
affairs’ (26 per cent) and ‘My tax affairs are too simple to require any expert advice’ 
(23 per cent). For those who did pay for tax advice, the main reasons given from 11 
specified options were ‘I feel happier knowing my returns are accurate’ (16 per cent), 
‘I can’t find or afford the time to deal with it myself’ (13 per cent), and ‘I want to be 
sure of getting the allowances I am entitled to’ (12 per cent).  The ranking of these 
reasons was similar to results reported by Pope and Fayle (1990), in their study on 
compliance costs in Australia.
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Table 5 shows some simple correlations among our variables.  Older taxpayers 
have more sources of income, have undertaken fewer years of post compulsory 
education, and have a more positive attitude to tax affairs than younger respondents.  
On average, women have lower income than men and a more negative attitude to tax 
affairs.  Both older respondents and women took more time to complete the 
questionnaire, while respondents with a higher income spent less time.  Taking a 
course in accountancy and being male are associated with higher income, and also 
with higher value of time, but not with more hours spent on tax affairs.  There are 
some shifts in the effect of different occupation categories because of their different 
implications for income; and finally, taxpayers with a higher income have higher total 
compliance costs (consistent with higher potential liability).  Some relationships 
shown in Table 5 seem intuitively surprising.  Those with more years of post 
compulsory education spend more time on tax affairs (probably because of higher 
income, tax liability and incentives); those who have completed courses in 
accountancy pay higher fees to tax advisors; respondents employing tax advisors 
spent more time on their tax affairs, and, within this group, the fees paid to advisers 
also increased as taxpayers’ own time did.  These results from the simple correlations 
motivate the regressions to enable further exploration.  Since the value of time spent 
on tax affairs was calculated by multiplying the hours spent on tax matters by an 
average hourly rate calculated from each individual’s total income, there is a strong 
correlation between the value of those hours, the number of hours expended and 
income.
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Table 8a9 shows the results of the regressions.  Total compliance costs increase 
with income, both because income itself is used to calculate the value of hours spent, 
and because the incentive to minimise tax liability increases with income. 
More surprisingly, total compliance costs also increased with the length of post 
compulsory education, even controlling for income; amongst components of 
compliance costs, this was also true for the time spent on tax affairs and the value of 
this time.  Undertaking courses in accountancy did not affect the total cost of 
compliance, but respondents who had followed courses in accountancy had a higher 
value of time and paid higher fees than those who did not.
Age or marital status affected neither compliance, nor any of its components.
Women spent the same number of hours on tax affairs as men, but their lower income 
meant that the monetary value of that time was lower.  
Taxpayers who were retired, self employed, unemployed or full time home-
makers spent more time on tax affairs and had higher total compliance costs than 
employed taxpayers.  The relatively high costs of self employed, unemployed or full 
time home-makers arise from this group spending more time and money than others 
on tax affairs.
Those who received income from different sources paid higher fees and the value
of their time spent on tax affairs was higher. We note a positive association between 
the value of the time spent on attending to tax affairs, and employment of a tax 
adviser.  We therefore have no direct evidence that taxpayers view these two 
components of their compliance costs (time and fees to advisers) as substitutes, 
though neither do our findings contradict such a hypothesis, and we certainly do not 
9
 Table 8b displays the preliminary results of the regressions; note that our analysis is based on the 
results of the parsimonious equations presented in Table 8a. 
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conclude that they are necessarily complements10.  The likely explanation is that as 
the complexity of tax affairs increases, they demand more of both the taxpayer’s time
and advice from a tax specialist.
Finally, we observe a positive relationship between total compliance cost (and
each of its component parts) and difficulty in attending to tax affairs. 
The factors which influence the hours of time seem to differ somewhat from those 
that determine the value of time, since income is excluded as an independent variable 
in the latter case (because of multicollinearity).  Turning to payment to advisers, we 
note that general education is not an influence; however those who have undertaken 
accounting courses are no more likely than others to employ advisers, but if they do 
so, they pay more.  The number of income sources raises the payment, as does having 
difficulty with tax affairs.
We did not attempt to measure the psychic costs of compliance directly, but we 
note a positive relationship between the total costs of compliance and whether the 
respondent found dealing with tax affairs difficult. Both the time (and its value)
devoted to tax and fees paid to advisors also increased with difficulty in attending to 
tax affairs.
We find little relationship between dislike of tax affairs and the amount of fees 
paid to advisers amongst those who do pay for tax advice.  The positive relation 
between compliance costs and difficulty of attending to tax affairs suggests that if 
psychic costs were included, these would increase the value of high compliance costs 
relative to the average even further.  We found no relationship between the time spent 
completing the form and hours spent on tax affairs, suggesting that time spent on tax 
10
 This could occur if tax advisers used more detailed information, imposing a data gathering cost on 
their clients.
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affairs seems to be specifically related to tax matters, rather than a characteristic of 
the individual concerned.  
Evidence on potential regressivity of compliance costs is shown in Table 9.  Both 
the ratio of fees paid to income and of total compliance costs to income decrease as 
income increases, indicating regressivity both for those individuals paying for tax 
advice, and for the whole sample.  We therefore conclude that overall compliance 
costs are regressive with respect to income within this income group.  
The sample is deliberately drawn to explore compliance costs amongst high 
income and high-complexity ‘Employment income’ taxpayers who filed their self 
assessment return before the penalty period; the majority of taxpayers in this study 
(approximately 62 per cent) have incomes over £48,000, twice the average income in 
the UK at this period.  Relative to the population of this category of taxpayers, the 
over 65s are under represented, and higher income levels over represented.  Like all 
such studies the survey suffers from an inherent potential problem of the 
methodology, namely that the results rest on the respondent’s ability to recall data on 
estimates of time and money spent on tax matters over a twelve-month period.  
However, we are encouraged by its similarity to other findings and believe it does 
throw some interesting light on the nature and extent of compliance costs under self 
assessment, with the implications discussed in the discussion and conclusion section
below.
The international comparison in Table 1 shows that the time spent by our 
respondents, a weighted average of 4.5 hours per annum when corrected for sample 
bias, is not dissimilar to Sandford et al.’s study in the UK in 1983-84, when the 
average time spent on tax affairs (by all tax payers) was 3.6 hours.  The unweighted 
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average figure for those with incomes above £50,000 pa, 12.6 hours, is a little higher 
than that obtained for the same group in the Sandford study11, undertaken before self
assessment was introduced.  Tran-Nam et al.’s analysis in Australia, conducted in the 
same circumstances as our study, i.e. 2 years after the introduction of self assessment,
shows much higher average time spent on federal tax across all taxpayers. The lower 
value of average time in our sample is rather surprising, given that we would expect 
their tax affairs to be particularly onerous.  The introduction of self assessment in the 
UK seems to have increased somewhat the time spent on tax affairs by taxpayers, but 
compliance costs remain a small proportion of income.
Amongst other countries with self assessment, only Delgado’s et al. estimates for 
Spain suggest lower compliance costs, with costs in Canada a little higher, and in 
Australia and the US much higher.  In the US, in particular, average hours spent are 
of the order of five times higher than for our sample, probably associated with the 
federal income tax self assessment process and the fact that many States also levy 
income tax. 
In terms of what determines compliance costs, a positive relationship with income 
was identified in both Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992) and in Sandford et al. (1989), 
who agree with our findings that higher-income taxpayers have greater compliance 
costs.  In our analysis, the level of income directly affects and is associated with 
higher compliance costs.  We find evidence that total compliance costs are regressive
(i.e. higher relative to income for low income respondents) among this group of 
taxpayers.  A similar pattern was identified by Sandford et al. (1989).
11
 We did not have sufficient information on the characteristics of this income group to weight the 
results.
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Our findings concur with Blumenthal and Slemrod who argue that compliance 
costs are not influenced by differences in age or marital status.  Further, we find no 
evidence that the elderly bear a higher burden of total tax compliance among the 
particular category of taxpayers in the study.  However, we do find that retired 
taxpayers spend more time dealing with their tax affairs and have higher compliance 
costs than other groups.  
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We find that the average compliance cost is surprisingly low relative to findings 
from similar studies in the UK before self assessment was introduced, and elsewhere.  
Compliance costs seem to have increased by only about a quarter (less than a fifth for 
the higher income group) since the introduction of self assessment.  We are not able 
to compare amounts paid to advisers because we do not have details from earlier 
studies, so it may be that these have increased, though we note that only a minority of 
our sample have employed them.  This is encouraging for the UK government and 
others planning to introduce self assessment schemes.
The positive relationship between total compliance costs and the difficulty in 
attending to tax affairs is unsurprising.  It highlights the negative effects of 
complexity on personal compliance costs and strengthens the argument for 
considering compliance costs in designing tax regimes.  The difficulty in dealing with 
tax affairs is a surrogate for the psychic costs of compliance.
Better educated tax payers are more able to identify opportunities for reducing 
their tax payments and so devote time to doing so.  This finding is consistent with our 
incentive model of tax compliance expenditure.  Such an explanation provides a 
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timely reminder that policy makers should consider the total welfare effects of tax 
mechanism design.  Changes which make the system more complex to address 
incentive issues in other markets are likely to impose costs on taxpayers.  They will 
seek to lower their own tax bills at the cost of more time spent on tax affairs.  While 
such behaviour is rational for the individual, it raises the total burden of tax on the 
economy because the lower tax bill is not an aggregate saving, representing a transfer 
from government to taxpayer.  If better educated taxpayers are incurring higher 
compliance costs because they recognise opportunities to reduce their tax bills, this 
may represent a net loss to social welfare.  It reinforces the argument for governments 
to analyse carefully the increased compliance costs associated with increased 
complexity which we have identified in this study.  In designing and extending tax 
schemes, it is important that governments take account of the compliance costs which 
they impose.
Those who have taken courses in accountancy and who employ tax advisers are 
likely to pay more for the advice perhaps because they encourage tax advisers to 
spend more time searching for potential savings in the tax bill.  
Compliance costs were related to the nature of the tax affairs and measurable 
characteristics of the individuals, rather than to unmeasured differences in taxpayers’
aptitude for bureaucratic tasks (which would be highly correlated with speed of 
questionnaire completion).  
In terms of the incidence and distribution of compliance costs, we find high 
absolute costs among our sample, even considering the complex nature of their tax 
affairs, with over 3 per cent expending more than £3,000 per year in time and money, 
and 1 per cent more than £5,000.  Although these figures appear large, they represent 
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a very small percentage of personal income tax revenue for this group of high income 
taxpayers. Self assessment does not impinge unfavourably on the elderly.  However 
the regressive nature of compliance costs among the taxpayers surveyed indicates the 
importance of designing a system in which the total burden of tax (tax liability plus 
compliance costs) is related appropriately to income. 
Compliance costs constitute an important deadweight loss in the economy, and 
affect the incentives of employees to participate in the labour market.  Our survey 
provides information about the factors and the incidence of compliance costs which 
have recently been transferred from government to individuals through self 
assessment.  The findings enable governments to assess the total benefit from 
introducing self assessment and raising complexity, providing useful guidance both to 
other countries who may be contemplating such a move, and to the UK government 
in reviewing the reform.  Our findings can help in the design of greater efficiency and 
to achieve more equitable outcomes.
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APPENDIX 1    TABLES
TABLE 1    SUMMARY OF MAJOR PUBLISHED STUDIES OF COMPLIANCE COSTS FOR PERSONAL INCOME TAX SINCE 1984
Author(s) and year of publication
Year under 
review Country
Self 
assessment Sample studied
Main demographic factors having 
an influence on compliance costs
Average time
(hrs)
This study 1998-99 UK X1 Employment income
 income > £50,000
Category of employment;
Number of years in education;
Number of income sources.
4.54
 12.6
Blaži (2004) 2001 Croatia - Taxpaying population n.a. 1.7
Klun (2004) 2000 Slovenia - id. n.a. 1.7
Delgado et al., (2001) 1998/99 Spain X id. n.a. 3.6/2.2
Tran-Nam et al., (2000) 1994-95 Australia X2 id. n.a. 8.5
Malmer (1995) 1983-93 Sweden - id. n.a. 1.4
Díaz and Delgado (1995) 1991 Spain X id. n.a. 6.8
Allers (1994) 1990 The 
Netherlands
- id. n.a. 4.5
Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992) 1989 USA X id. Category of employment;
Size of income.
27.4
Pope and Fayle (1990) 1986-87 Australia - id. n.a. 10.7
Vaillancourt (1989) 1986-87 Canada X id. Category of employment;
Size of income;
Number of income sources.
5.5
Sandford et al., (1989) 1983-84 UK - Taxpaying population3
Employment income 
 income  £50,000
n.a. 3.6
7.5
 10.7
Tiebel (1986) 1984 Germany - - n.a. 11
Slemrod and Sorum (1984) 1982 USA X id. Category of employment. 21.7
Note: studies from developing countries are not included in this table. 1 SA was introduced in 1996; 2 SA was introduced in 1992; 3 Analysed by 
income group and Schedule; 4 Weighted average (corrected for the unrepresentativeness of the sample).
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TABLE 2 COMPARISON BETWEEN SAMPLE AND POPULATION
Current sample Original population
Paying for tax advice
Yes 27 % 38 %
No 73 % 62%
Age
16-24 0 % 0 %
25-34 8 % 6 %
35-44 29 % 18 %
45-54 33 % 19 %
55-64 18 % 16 %
65 and over 12 % 41 %
Income 
Less than £10,000 5 % 39 %
£10,000-£50,000 33 % 52 %
Over £50,000 62 % 10 %
Types of income
Salaries (other than Company Director) 73 % 68 %
Interest 73 % 67 %
Dividends 62 % 39 %
Pensions 18 % 30 %
Rent 10 % 12 %
Self employment 2 % 6 %
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TABLE 3    DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES USED IN THE STUDY
Variable Mean S.D. Min
.
Max. Definition
Hours spent on tax affairs 8.35 10.22 0.50 65 Number of hours spent on tax affairs (1 outlier removed)
Value of time spent on 
tax affairs
326 442 3.39 2540 Total personal income divided by 1772 and multiplied by the 
number of hours spent on tax matters (in £) (See Sandford et al., 
1989) (3 outliers removed)
Fees to advisers 698 731 50 3500 Amount in fees paid to advisors for help with tax affairs (in £) (3 
outliers removed)
Incidental expenses 14.65 65.63 0 650 Incidental expenses associated with tax affairs (in £); include 
travel, telephone charges and other personal expenses (1 outlier 
removed)
Monetary expenditure 186 484 0 3510 Fees paid to adviser for help with tax affairs and incidental 
expenses (in £) (4 outliers removed)
Total compliance costs 498 804 3.39 6622 Value of time and total monetary expenditure (in £) (4 outliers 
removed)
Income 69477 44535 2000 150000 Total personal income (mid-points: £2,000 to £150,000, 17 
categories)
Education 5.11 2.74 0 13 Number of years spent in formal education after school (1 outlier 
removed)
Course in accountancy 0.41 0.49 0 1 1 if education includes courses in accountancy, 0 otherwise  
Age 50 12 30 72 Respondent’s age (mid-points: 29.5 to 70 years old, 5 categories)
Gender 0.14 0.35 0 1 1 if female, 0 otherwise
Marital status 0.80 0.40 0 1 1 if married, 0 otherwise
Company director° 0.24 0.43 0 1 1 if company director, 0 otherwise
Retired° 0.13 0.34 0 1 1 if retired, 0 otherwise
Other° 0.01 0.08 0 1 1 if self employed, unemployed, FT homemaker, 0 otherwise
Number of income 
sources
3.41 1.60 1 13 Number of various forms of income received by respondents 
(salaries, director’s salaries/fees, income received in kind, business 
profits, partnership income, rent, royalties, annuities, interest from 
banks or building societies, dividends from stocks and shares, state 
and other pensions, other state benefits, trust income, capital gains, 
earned income from abroad, investment income from abroad)
Attitude towards tax 
affairs
3.66 0.82 2 5 1 if ‘I very much enjoy it’; 2 if ‘I enjoy it’; 3 if ‘I neither enjoy nor 
dislike it’; 4 if ‘I dislike it’; 5 if ‘I very much dislike it’
Difficulty with tax affairs 2.00 0.77 1 4 1 if ‘I find my tax affairs simple to deal with’; 2 if ‘I find a few 
difficulties in attending to my tax affairs’; 3 if ‘I experience 
considerable difficulty in attending to my tax affairs’; 4 if ‘I find 
very great difficulty in attending to my tax affairs’
Time taken to complete 
the questionnaire
15.46 10.10 2 60 Time taken to complete the questionnaire (in minutes)
Paying for tax advice 0.27 0.45 0 1 1 if taxpayer pays for tax advice, 0 otherwise
Note: extreme values were dropped to avoid possible negative influence on the results.  
° The dummy variable ‘occupation’ includes employee, company director, retired and other; the reference category is employee.
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TABLE 4    EXPECTED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN VARIABLES
Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables 
Hours spent on tax 
affairs
Value of time spent on 
tax affairs
Fees paid to tax 
adviser(s)
Total compliance costs
prediction
Income + / - not included + +
Education - + not included +
Courses in accountancy undertaken - + + / - dk
Age + + dk +
Female dk - dk -
Married - + dk dk
Company director + + + +
Retired + + + +
Other (=self employed, unemployed, FT homemaker) + + + +
Number of income sources + + + +
Attitude towards tax affairs - + . dk
Difficulty with tax affairs + + + +
Time taken to complete the questionnaire + - dk dk
Paying for assistance with tax affairs - + not included not included
+, positive relationship between variables; -, negative relationship between variables; dk, do not know.
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TABLE 5 CORRELATION BETWEEN VARIABLES
Hours 
spent on 
tax 
affairs
Value of 
time 
spent on 
tax 
affairs
Fees to 
advisers
Total 
compliance 
costs Income Education 
Courses in 
accountancy Age Gender 
Number 
of
 income 
sources
Whether 
paying for 
tax advice
Attitude 
towards tax 
affairs
Difficulty 
with tax 
affairs
Time taken to 
complete the 
questionnaire
Hours spent on tax 
affairs
1 .773*** .372*** .496*** .014 .174*** -.048 .019 -.039 .197*** .104* .175** .284*** .014
Value of time spent on 
tax affairs
1 .372*** .727*** .482*** .199*** .123* -.027 -.111* .340*** .187*** .100* .296*** -.076
Fees to advisers 1 .858*** .051 .018 .351*** -.005 .020 .095 n.a. .142 .307*** .034
Total compliance costs 1 .308*** .069 .114* .058 -.036 .275*** .506*** .080 .343*** .015
Income 1 .167*** .181*** -.070 -.277*** .277*** .131** -.116** .026 -.170**
Education 1 .021 -.196*** -.067 .181*** -.093 -.060 .089 -.013
Courses in accountancy 1 -.100 .031 .105* .038 -.139** -.098 -.101
Age 1 -.027 .109* .069 -.143** -.016 .189***
Gender 1 .055 .045 .190*** .175*** .158**
Number of income 
sources
1 .171*** .019 .152*** .006
Whether paying for tax 
advice
1 .119** .296*** .079
Attitude towards tax 
affairs
1 .492*** .053
Difficulty with tax 
affairs 
1 .061
Time taken to complete 
the questionnaire
1
Note: all variables are defined in Table 3. *** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level; * Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level.  
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TABLE 6    WEIGHTED AVERAGE COMPLIANCE COSTS
Average Weighted average
Hours spent on 
tax affairs
Total compliance 
costs (in £)
Hours spent on 
tax affairs
Total compliance 
costs (in £)
Paying for tax 
advice
11.03 1157.15 4.19 439.72
Not paying for 
tax advice
7.48 306.61 4.64 190.10
TABLE 7 AVERAGE COMPLIANCE COSTS FOR DIFFERENT INCOME GROUPS
Income Paying for tax 
advice
Hours spent Total compliance 
costs (in £)
yes 5.00 241.77Less than £10,000
no 5.71 18.58
yes 7.50 692.75Between £10,000 
and £50,000 no 7.47 200.53
yes 12.59 1357.38Over £50,000
no 7.76 392.75
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TABLE 8A DETERMINANTS OF TAX COMPLIANCE COSTS: PARSIMONIOUS EQUATIONS
Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables 
Hours spent on tax 
affairsa
Value of time spent on 
tax affairsa
Fees paid to tax 
adviser(s)a,b
Total compliance costsa
Constant -1.171*
(0.656)
2.744***
(0.401)
4.139***
(0.443)
-7.775***
(0.768)
Incomea 0.116*
(0.059)
Not included 1.059***
(0.069)
Educationa 0.368***
(0.082)
0.561***
(0.188)
0.168*
(0.097)
Courses in accountancy undertaken (‘no’ as reference)
Yes 0.322**
(0.148)
0.543**
(0.242)
Gender (male as reference)
Female -0.794***
(0.214)
Occupation (employed as reference)
Retired 0.425***
(0.148)
0.511***
(0.173)
Other (=self employed, unemployed, FT homemaker) 0.773**
(0.307)
1.163*
(0.679)
1.041***
(0.349)
Number of income sourcesa 0.473***
(0.136)
0.569**
(0.257)
Paying for assistance with tax affairs (‘no’ as reference)
Yes 0.384**
(0.185)
Not included Not included
Difficulty with tax affairs 0.443***
(0.061)
0.384***
(0.102)
0.353**
(0.161)
0.625***
(0.077)
R Squared 0.245 0.252 0.316 0.547
ANOVA sig. 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Number of observations 290 232 55 274
Note: standard errors are given in parenthesis.  a The natural logarithm if these variable are used in estimation; b Note that Y included 
but not significant. *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level; * Significant at the 0.1 level.  
Page 32 of 36
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
33
TABLE 8B    DETERMINANTS OF TAX COMPLIANCE COSTS (NON PARSIMONIOUS EQUATIONS)
Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables 
Hours spent on tax 
affairsa
Value of time spent on 
tax affairsa
Fees paid to tax 
adviser(s)a
Total compliance costsa
Constant -2.911* (1.731) 2.613*** (0.923) 4.643 (3.842) -8.724*** (1.920)
Incomea 0.212** (0.098) Not included 0.165 (0.201) 1.020*** (0.110)
Educationa 0.257 (0.163) .475** (0.231) -0.506 (0.478) 0.353* (0.183)
Courses in accountancy undertaken (‘no’ as reference) 0.074 (0.134) .305 (0.187) 0.526* (0.293) -0.035 (0.151)
Agea 0.048 (0.358) .010 (0.011) -0.466 (0.734) 0.143 (0.400)
Gender (male as reference) -0.178 (0.222) -.784** (0.303) 0.444 (0.649) -0.173 (0.243)
Married -0.071 (0.161) -.139 (0.225) 0.724* (0.379) -0.174 (0.176)
Occupation (employed as reference)
Company director -0.138 (0.157) .008 (0.219) 0.217 (0.412) 0.029 (0.167)
Retired 0.405 (0.253) -.347 (0.360) 1.042* (0.602) 0.523* (0.277)
Other (=self employed, unemployed, FT homemaker) 1.117*** (0.372) -.221 (0.589) 2.016** (0.850) 1.147*** (0.404)
Number of income sourcesa .177 (0.121) .359** (0.170) 0.666* (0.348) 0.160 (0.139)
Attitude towards tax affairs .076 (0.093) -.049 (0.129) 0.071 (0.266) -0.072 (0.104)
Difficulty with tax affairs .519*** (0.104) .463*** (0.148) 0.298 (0.286) 0.729*** (0.118)
Time taken to complete the questionnairea .050 (0.108) .071 (0.152) -0.238 (0.292) 0.195 (0.120)
Paying for assistance with tax affairs (‘no’ as reference) .031 (0.031) .194 (0.224) Not included Not included
R Squared 0.338 0.264 0.443 0.611
ANOVA sig. 0.000 0.000 0.071 0.000
Number of observations 153 150 45 143
Note: standard errors are given in parenthesis.  a The natural logarithm if these variable are used in estimation.  
*** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level; * Significant at the 0.1 level.
TABLE 9    REGRESSIVITY OF COMPLIANCE COSTS
                 Dependent variable
Independent variable
Ratio
hours/income
Ratio
fees/income
Ratio
total compliance costs/income
Constant 0.001***
(0.000)
0.044***
(0.007)
0.012***
(0.002)
Income -3.92E-09***
(0.000)
-3.18E-07***
(0.000)
-5.10E-08**
(0.000)
Note: standard errors are given in parenthesis. *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level.
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APPENDIX 2    CONSTITUENT PARTS OF COMPLIANCE COSTS
BOX 1A    REGRESSION EQUATIONS
The regression equations take the following forms:
ln Cih =  + 1 ln Yi + 2 ln Ei + 3 CAi + 4 ln Ai + 5 Fi + 6 Mi + 7 Oi + 8 ln FYi + 9 ATi + 10 DTi + 11 lnTi + 12 TAi + i
ln Civ =  + 1 ln Ei + 2 CAi + 3 ln Ai + 4 Fi + 5 Mi + 6 Oi + 7 ln FYi + 8 ATi + 9 DTi + 10 lnTi + 11 TAi + i
ln Cif =  + µ1 ln Yi + µ2 ln Ei + µ3 CAi + µ4 ln Ai + µ5 Fi + µ6 Mi + µ7 Oi + µ8 ln FYi + µ9 ATi + µ10 DTi + µ11 lnTi + i
Where:  
ln Cih = natural logarithm of ‘hours spent’ (provided directly by respondents)
ln Civ = natural logarithm of ‘value of time’ (calculated, see Table 3) 
ln Cif = natural logarithm of ‘fees paid to advisers’ (provided directly by respondents)
ln Yi = natural logarithm of ‘income’
ln Ei = natural logarithm of ‘education’
CAi = course in accountancy undertaken (bivariate variable)
ln Ai = natural logarithm of ‘age’
Fi = female (bivariate variable)
Mi = married (bivariate variable)
Oi = occupation (dummy variable)
ln FYi = natural logarithm of ‘number of income sources’
ATi = attitude towards tax affairs (categorical variable)
DTi = difficulty with tax affairs (categorical variable)
ln Ti = natural logarithm of ‘time taken to complete the questionnaire’
TAi = paying for tax advice (bivariate variable)
i = error term
Notes: C3 only includes respondents who did pay for tax advice; the subscript ‘i’ refers to an 
individual taxpayer.
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We first examine the determinants of time spent on tax affairs (first equation, Box 
1a).  We expect similar causality as for overall financial compliance.  The dummy 
“paying for tax advice” was used to identify whether there was a substitution between 
time spent and paying for tax advice.  If so then individuals who pay for tax advice 
should spend less time on their tax affairs.  
In our second equation (Box 1a), the dependent variable is the value of time 
calculated by multiplying the hours spent by average hourly personal income.  It is 
clearly closely related to the previous equation, and the explanatory variables are the
same, with the exception of income, which was dropped to avoid problems of 
multicollinearity.  While we expect the pattern of this equation to be similar to 
equation 1 from which it derives, details will vary where there is a relationship 
between an explanatory variable and hourly income.  For example gender will have a 
different effect because the average income of women is lower than for men.  
Similarly, education is positively correlated with income.  
The third equation (Box 1a) relates the amount paid to advisers to similar 
independent variables for the subset of respondents who pay for tax advice (the 
variable ‘paying for tax advice, TA, was consequently not included in the equation).  
We expected that both the incentive effect and the value of time effect would result in 
level of fees paid to advisers increasing with the level of income.  If courses in 
accountancy have been undertaken, individuals may need to seek less outside advice.  
For the variables age, female and marital status, we had no prior expectations.  We 
expect employees to need to pay less than other professions, and individuals with a 
Page 35 of 36
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
36
large number of income sources to pay more.  Attitude towards tax affairs should not 
make a difference to the amount of fees paid, but respondents who find dealing with 
their tax affairs difficult, and those who dislike tax affairs are likely to pay more, 
reflecting the disutility of handling their own tax return.  The time taken to complete 
the questionnaire should not affect the amount paid to tax advisers, though it might 
affect whether such help was sought. 
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